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Message Text

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 09074 212118Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 /026 W
----------075050 212120Z /64
P 211845Z OCT 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2235

S E C R E T GENEVA 9074

EXDIS USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-PLENARY CONVERSATIONS
OCTOBER 19, 1977 (SALT TWO)

1. (ROWNY/BELETSKY)

CRUISE MISSILES

BELETSKY SAID THAT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE US DELEGATION HAD FORMULATED ITS PROVISIONS WOULD PERMIT SLCMS AND GLCMS TO BE TESTED FROM AIRCRAFT. BOWNY SAID THAT THE KEY TO DISTINGUISHING ONE TYPE OF CRUISE MISSILE FROM ANOTHER WAS NOT THE MISSILES THEMSELVES BUT RATHER THEIR LANUCHERS. BELETSKY REPEATED THAT IT WAS THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION THAT SEAAABASED AND LAND-BASED CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE TESTED FROM AIRCRAFT. ROWNY TOLD BELETSKY THAT BOTH SIDES HAD MADE CONCESSIONS AT THE TALKS IN WASHINGTON AND THAT CERTAIN CONCESSIONS WE HAD MADE WERE MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF AN INTEGRAL PACKAGE WHICH WOULD CONSTRAIN OUR CRUISE MISSILE PROGRAMS FOR THE PERIOD OF THE PROTOCOL BUT WOULD MPERMIT FUTURE OPTIONS. SOME PARTS OF THE BARGAIN STRUCK IN WASHINGTON WERE IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPROMISES WHICH WOULD GIVE US, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE FREEDOM TO TEST CRUISE MISSILES

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FROM AIRCRAFT. GENERAL BELETSKY INSISTED THAT WE NEED TO NEGOTIATE ALL UNAGREED ITEMS, SUCH AS TESTING GLCMS AND SLCMS FROM AIRCRAFT, HERE IN GENEVA. ROWNY TOLD BELETSKY THAT HE COULD NOT NEGOTIATE THESE ITEMS SINCE THEY WERE NOT NEGOTIABLE AT OUR LEVEL.

2. (PEREZ - SCHNEITER/SHCHUKIN)

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NEW TYPES

SHCHUKIN INITIATED THE SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION BY ASKING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US DEFINITION OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBSMS, AND ARTICLE X OF THE TREATY, WHICH GAVE THE SIDES THE RIGHTS OF MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT. PEREZ AND SCHNEITER RESPONDED THAT ARTICLE X PROVIDED FOR MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT "SUBJECT TO THE PORVISIONS OF THIS TREATY." SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US PROPOSED THAT A NEW TYPE OF MISSILE WOULD BE CREATED IF A CURRENT MISSILE HAD ONE OF THE LISTED COMPONENTS MODIFIED OR REPLACED. PEREZ AND SCHNEITER CONFIRMED THAT UNDERSTANDING, ADDING THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF A COMPONENT WITH A NEW TYPE OF COMPONENT WAS WHAT CONSTITUTED A CHANGE OF MISSILE TYPE. SHCHUKIN ASKED WHAT MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT COULD BE CARRIED OUT ACCORDING TO THE US PROPOSAL. PEREZ NOTED THAT SOFTWARE CHANGES WERE NOT PROHIBITED. SHCHUKIN ASKED WHETHER IMPROVEMENTS MADE TO THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM OF AN SLBM, SUCH AS THE REPLACEMENT OF CERTAIN INSTRUMENTS WITH OTHER INSTRUMENTS OF A DIFFERENT TYPE, WOULD MAKE THE SLBM OF A NEW TYPE. PEREZ SAID THAT IT WOULD. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THINGS DIF-FERENTLY. THIS WAS A SERIOUS QUESTION AND SHOULD BE DIS-CUSSED MOST SERIOUSLY. HE THOUGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT PENETRATION AIDS COULD BE CHANGED WITHOUT CREATING A NEW

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TYPE OF ICBM OR SLBM. PEREZ NOTED THAT UNDER THE US PRO-POSAL, IF A PROBLEM DEVELOPED WITH A SIDE'S MISSILES, IT COULD REPLACE COMPONENTS WITH SIMILAR COMPONENTS, BUT IT COULD NOT REPLACE THEM WITH DIFFERENT COMPONENTS. SHCHUKIN ASKED IF A MINUTEMAN III WOULD BECOME A NEW TYPE IF ITS WARHEAD WERE REPLACED WITH A NEW WARHEAD. PEREZ AND SCHNEITER CONFIRMED THAT REPLACEMENT BY A WAR-HEAD OF A NEW TYPE WOULD CONSTITUE A CHANGE IN MISSILE TYPE. PEREZ SAID THAT THE US HAD IN MIND THE USE OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS TO DETECT CHANGES IN COMPONENTS. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HAVE AN INVENTORY OF SUCH ELEMENTS, WHICH WOULD GO BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THE QUESTIONS WE WERE NOW DISCUSSING. PEREZ ASKED WHAT THE SOVIET SIDE MEANT BY NEW TYPES. SHCHUKIN SAID THAT IN DUE COURSE, IF REQUIRED, THIS COULD BE DISCUSSED.

3. (WOLLAN - KWECIAK/BEKETOV - JOURAVLEV)

NEW TYPES

BEKETOV COMPARED THE SOVIET RSM-50 AND US TRIDENT C-4 IN LIGHT OF COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF ARTICLE II.5 AND

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US PROPOSAL FOR PROTOCOL. INFORMED THAT THE TRIDENT C-4
WAS NOT YET DEPLOYED, BEKETOV STATED THAT THE RSM-50 WAS
DEPLOYED, AND THAT THEREFORE THE C-4 AND RSM-50 ARE NOT
IN THE SAME CATEGORY. THIS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO EXEMPT
THE C-4 AND RSM-50 ON AN EQUAL BASIS AS THE US PROPOSAL DID.

CRUISE MISSILES
BEKETOV THEN ASKED THE RELATIONSHIP OF PARA 2 TO
PARA 1 OF PROTOCOL ARTICLE III. HE ASKED IF IT WAS
CORRECT FOR THE SOVIET SIDE TO ASSUME THAT ANY CRUISE
MISSILE COULD BE TESTED FROM AN AIRCRAFT UP TO A RANGE
OF 2,500 KILOMETERS. WOLLAN RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A
CORRECT ASSUMPTION. BEKETOV THEN SUGGESTED THAT IT
COULD BE POSSIBLE TO TEST A SEA-BASED OR LAND-BASED CRUISE
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MISSILE UP TO 2,500 KILOMETERS. WOLLAN RESPONDED THAT
THIS IS NOT A PRECISE VIEW BECAUSE THE US FORMULATION
DOES NOT ADDRESS A SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILE OR A LAND-
BASED CRUISE MISSILE, BUT SIMPLY CRUISE MISSILES. THE
DISTINCTION WAS MADE WITH THE LAUNCHERS. EARLE

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SALT (ARMS CONTROL), ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, TEST FACILITIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 21-Oct-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977GENEVA09074
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X1
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770388-0468
Format: TEL
From: GENEVA
Handling Restrictions:
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19771035/aaaabdew.tel
Line Count: 141
Litigation Code IDs:
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Litigation History:
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Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 14-Mar-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 834932
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: HIGHLIGHTS OF POST-PLENARY CONVERSATIONS OCTOBER 19, 1977 (SALT TWO)
TAGS: PARM
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/86c49c29-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
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22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009